INTRODUCTION
In Witte v. United StatesI the Supreme Court held that where the legislature has authorized a particular punishment range for a given crime, a sentence within that range constitutes punishment only for the convicted offense for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 2 In this case, the United States Sentencing Guidelines required sentencing courts to consider relevant conduct when computing a sentence within a particular range. 8 The Court held that a defendant could be convicted and sentenced for an offense that a sentencing court had considered as relevant conduct in a previous sentencing. 4 This Note concludes that the majority correctly ruled that subsequent conviction of "relevant conduct" does not result in double punishment for the same crimes under the DoubleJeopardy Clause. First, this Note contends that the Sentencing Guidelines require the same Double Jeopardy analysis as the one used traditionally. Second, this Note argues that the majority's decision was consistent with congressional intent regarding "relevant conduct" and multiple convictions. Finally, this Note rejectsJustice Stevens' dissenting argument 5 that the distinction between the character of the defendant and the character of the offense barred a second sentence for actions considered as "relevant conduct" for a previous offense. This Note asserts that Justice Stevens' distinction is unworkable for federal sentencing courts.
II. BACKGROUND

A.
OVERVIEW OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against both a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction 7 and multiple punishments for the same offense. 8 The Double Jeopardy Clause principally restrains courts and prosecutors, while leaving the legislature free to define crimes and fix punishments. 9 Once the legislature has defined crimes and fixed punishments, courts cannot impose more than one punishment for the same offense and, ordinarily, prosecutors cannot attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial. 10 Courts must assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that Congress did not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. 11
Evolution of the Double Jeopardy Clause Analysis.
In 1932, the Supreme Court, in Blockburger v. United States,' 2 set forth a test to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated where a defendant was subject to multiple convictions.' 3 The defendant in Blockburger was convicted of violating certain provisions of the Harrison Narcotic Act, 14 including three counts in relation to selling morphine hydrochloride to the same purchaser. 15 Two of these counts charged two separate sale transactions of the drug not in its original stamped package. 1 6 The third count charged the second sale as having been made not in pursuance of a written order of the purchaser as required by statute. 1 7 The defendant argued that second and third counts constituted one offense, for which only a single pen-
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY/SENTENCING GUIDELJNES alty could be imposed.' 8 The Court held that "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether th re are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."' 9 Thus, under the Blockburger test, the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated where the defendant is prosecuted under two statutes that require proof of the same elements. 20 The Supreme Court constructed a different Double Jeopardy test forty years later. In Ashe v. Swenson, 2 ' the defendant was retried following an initial acquittal for robbing participants in a poker game. 22 The Court held that collateral estoppel was part of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against Double Jeopardy. 23 Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart argued that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot be relitigated. 2 4 Under the majority's "same evidence" test, when there is a general verdict of acquittal, a court must look at the prior proceedings and conclude whether the jury grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. 25 Justice Brennan concurred with the Ashe majority's 2 6
holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause includes collateral estoppel. 2 7 However, he advocated the "same transaction" test, where the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution to join at one trial all the charges against the defendant which "grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction." 2 8 Thus, Ashe offered the "same evidence" test and the "same transaction" test to determine a Double Jeopardy Clause violation. Grady v. Corbin 2 9 introduced the "same conduct" test to determine Double Jeopardy violations. 30 In Grady, the defendant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated, then was later charged with reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide based on the same incident that gave rise to the misdemeanor charges. 3 The Supreme Court overruled Grady's "same conduct" test three years later in United States v. Dixon. 3 5 In Dixon, two defendants were tried for criminal contempt of court for violating court orders that prohibited them from engaging in conduct that was later the subject of criminal prosecutions. 3 6 The Court reaffirmed Blockburger's "same element" test for Double Jeopardy violations, 3 7 and emphasized that the Double Jeopardy protections do not require that a subsequent prosecution satisfy a "same conduct" test. 3 8 The Blockburger "same element" test is the current test used to determine Double Jeopardy violations.
Enhancement Statutes and the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Recidivist statutes and other enhanced-sentence laws have been sustained by the Supreme Court against the contention that they violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 3 9 These statutes are directed at defendants who are convicted of criminal offenses following at least one previous conviction. 40 The statutes usually include sentence enhancement, parole preclusion, or delayed parole eligibility based on a prior conviction.
1
The Supreme Court rationalized that a sentencing court punishes the last offense committed more severely due to the consequence which the party had previously brought himself. 42 A recidivist statute imposes a higher punishment for the same offense upon a person 1996]
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who proves, by a second or third conviction, that the former punishment has been ineffective in reforming him. 43 Thus, enhanced punishment imposed for a later offense is not a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crime. 44 Rather, the enhancement is "a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive one." 45 B.
SENTENCING BEFORE THE PROMULGATION OF THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES.
Even before the promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines, judges had the discretion to take into account circumstances surrounding a criminal's offense at sentencing. In Williams v. New York, 4 6 the defendant was convicted of murder, and the jury recommended life imprisonment. 47 The trial judge imposed the death sentence after considering additional information from the court's "Probation Department and.., other sources." 48 The Supreme Court held that a New York judge, charged with the responsibility of determining a sentence under a New York statute with a broad sentencing range, was not restricted to the information received in open court. 49 Rather, the judge was allowed discretion in fixing the punishment. 50 The Williams Court noted that a sentencing judge may exercise wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence he uses when determining the punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law. 5 ' A sentencing judge's task, within statutory and constitutional limits, is to assess the type and extent of punishment after guilt has been determined. 51, 55 (1937) ("For the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.")).
In Williams v. Oklahoma, 54 the defendant pleaded guilty to a murder charge and received a sentence of life in prison. 55 Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to kidnapping the murder victim and received the death penalty.
5 6 The defendant challenged the death penalty sentence, claiming that the court punished him twice for the same offense when the judge took the murder of his victim into consideration. 5 7 The Supreme Court held that the sentencing judge could consider the defendant's murder of a kidnapping victim as an aggravating circumstance in determining the kidnapping sentence. 58 The Court reasoned that this would not punish the defendant a second time for the same offense because though the defendant had previously been convicted of the murder, kidnapping was a separate and distinct crime from murder under Oklahoma law. 59 The Oklahoma statute required the imposition of a sentence within a particular range, as determined by the sentencingjudge. 60 Once guilt was established, the sentencing judge could consider responsible "out-of-court" information relative to the circumstances of the crime and to the convicted person's life and characteristics in order to determine the proper sentence within a particular range. 6 The defendants argued that visible possession of a firearm was an element of the crimes for which they were sentenced and thus had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 68 The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the defendants and upheld the Act. 69 The Court found the Act constitutional, reasoning that it did not alter the maximum sentence for the offenses of aggravated assault and voluntary manslaughter or create separate offenses with separate penalties. 70 Rather, the Act only limited the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a minimum punishment within the given range. 7 1 According to the McMillan Court, the Act was not fashioned to allow the surrounding circumstance of the visible possession to be "a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense." 72 Rather the Court thought that the Act selected one factor that sentencing courts traditionally considered as affecting the punishment and specified the exact weight to be given to that factor. 7 3
Williams v. New York, Williams v. Oklahoma, and McMillan demonstrate the Supreme Court's acceptance and approval ofjudicial discretion within legislative sentencing guidelines well before the promulgation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Moreover, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of taking into account surrounding circumstances when sentencing a defendant.
C.
THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Background
In response to the lack of consistency in sentences imposed by federal courts and supervised by the Parole Commission, Congress created the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 74 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 revised the old sentencing process in several ways. First, it rejected imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation 77 in favor of imprisonment as fulfilling retributive, deterrent, and incapacitative goals. 78 Second, the Act consolidated the power that had been exercised by the sentencing judge and the Parole Commission by creating the United States Sentencing Commission. The Act directed the Commission to devise the Sentencing Guidelines, and prospectively abolish the Parole Commission. 79 Third, the Act made sentences, for the most part, determinate, because a prisoner's sentence can only be reduced by credit earned for good behavior. 8 0 Fourth, the Act made the Sentencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines binding on the courts, although it reserved some discretion for judges to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines for mitigating or aggravating circumstances not adequately considered by the Commission. 81 Finally, the Act authorized appellate review of the sentence, permitting a defendant to appeal a sentence that is above a defined range, and the Government the right to appeal a sentence that is below that range. 8 2 Thus, the Sentencing Guidelines were meant to establish a range of determinate sentences for categories of offenses and defendants according to various specified factors.
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY/SENTENUCING GUIDELINES base offense levels for various offenses in particular guidelines. 85 Depending on the crime and the related circumstances, a particular guideline provides instructions for selecting and adjusting offense levels. 8 6 The base offense level is on an axis on the guideline table which specifies an appropriate punishment range. 8 7 The other axis reflects the defendant's criminal history category. 8 8 The point at which the offense level and criminal history category intersect on the sentencing table determines an offender's guideline range. 89 For example, if a defendant pleads guilty to a drug-related offense, such as possession with the intent to distribute two kilograms of powder cocaine, the sentencing court begins with the guideline entitled "Offense Involving Drugs." 9 0 The most important elements in setting the base offense level are the type and quantity of drugs involved. 9 1 Because the hypothetical defendant's offense involved two kilograms of powder cocaine, he would receive a base offense level of 26.92 The base offense level is adjusted upward by a predetermined amount for drug offenses that have "specific offense characteristics," such as possession of a dangerous weapon. 93 The court then considers other general offense level adjustments, including aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the guideline, and adjusts the sentence accordingly. 94 By pleading guilty to the offense, the hypothetical defendant would receive a two level decrease reflecting his acceptance of responsibility. 95 Finally, the court considers the defendant's prior criminal involvement within the criminal history category. 9 6 In this example, the defendant receives a sentence of imprisonment of two years, which places him in category I. 9 7 The guideline table specifies 85 U.S.S.G., supra note 74, § 1B1.1. The sentencing procedure is as follows: the judge determines the base offense level and applies any specific offense characteristics contained in the particular guideline; next the judge adjusts the offense level as appropriate related to the victim, role in the offense, and obstruction ofjustice; if there are multiple counts, the judge groups the various counts and adjusts the offense level; the judge then adjusts the offense level for acceptance of responsibility; finally, the judge determines the guideline range corresponding to the offense level and defendant criminal history category, and determines the sentencing requirements by referring to Specific Offender Characteristics and Departures. d. 86 Id. 87 Id. a particular punishment range corresponding to the defendant's offense level and criminal history category. 98 This defendant would receive a punishment of imprisonment between sixty-three and seventyeight months. 99 The Sentencing Guidelines give the sentencing courts wide discretion to take into account past criminal behavior, even where there is no conviction.' 0 0 Two topics relevant to the determination of a defendant's sentence in this type of case are "relevant conduct" and the procedural safeguards regarding multiple convictions.
"Relevant Conduct"
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing range for a particular offense is determined on the basis of all "relevant conduct" in which the defendant engaged and notjust on the basis of the underlying offense of the conviction. l0 1 Section 1B1.3(a) (2) directs the sentencing court to consider acts "that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."
Offenses qualify as part of the same course of conduct if they are adequately related to each other as to assure the conclusion that they are part of a single episode or pattern of offenses. 
Procedural Safeguards Regarding Multiple Convictions
The Sentencing Guidelines contemplate the possibility of separate prosecutions involving the same or overlapping conduct. When related crimes committed by the same defendant are not prosecuted in the same proceeding, § 5G1.3 attempts to coordinate sentences by having the punishments approximate the total penalty that the court would have imposed if the sentences had been imposed at the same time. 0 5 If an offender is serving an undischarged prison term for offenses that the sentencing court took into account when determining the offense level for the instant offense, § 5G1.3(b) provides that "the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment." 0 6
Where § 5G1.3(b) does not apply, the sentencing court must impose a sentence that will run consecutively to the prior undischarged prison term for as long as necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment.
07
The Sentencing Guidelines also provide some flexibility in sentencing by allowing, under certain circumstances, the sentencing court to depart from the guideline range. 08 Further, an offender may protect his interests through an appropriate appeal if a sentencing court misapplies the Sentencing Guidelines. 0 9
D. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Prior to United States v. Witte,"1 0 the Second and Tenth Circuits addressed the relationship between the Sentencing Guidelines' "relevant conduct" and the Double Jeopardy Clause. Both circuits held that separate punishment for an offense taken into account as "relevant conduct" when sentencing the offender for a prior conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In United States v. Koonce,"' the defendant was found guilty of distributing methamphetamine in the United States District Court of the the same criminal conduct or for different criminal transactions that were part of the same course of conduct.").
105 d. § 5G1.3, cmt. 3. 108 Id. § 5K2.0 ("Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) the sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range established by the applicable guideline, if the court finds 'that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.'").
109 FED. R-. CRIM. P. 35(a) ("The court shall correct a sentence that is determined on appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to have been imposed... as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, or to be unreasonable, upon remand of the case to the court.., for further sentencing proceedings if, after such proceedings, the court determines that the original sentence was incorrect.").
110 115 S. The Tenth Circuit considered three issues in deciding whether the second prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against multiple punishment. 1 1 6 First, the court found that increasing the offense level in light of the defendant's related conduct was punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 17 Second, the court decided that Congress did not intend the defendant to be subjected to two punishments for the related conduct. 1 18 Finally, the court held that imposing concurrent rather than consecutive sentences did not avoid Double Jeopardy issues. 1 1 9
The Tenth Circuit noted that, absent evidence to the contrary, the court should assume that Congress did not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. 120 The Koonce court did not believe that Congress wanted the Sentencing Guidelines' punishment to be larger if the government chose to prosecute in two proceedings rather than consolidate all counts in one proceeding. 12 124 Meanwhile, the defendant had also been charged with bank fraud, mail fraud, and related crimes in the District of Vermont 125 Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, the Connecticut sentencing court took into account the defendant's "relevant conduct" in Vermont, and increased his offense level. 126 Following this sentencing, the Vermont district court found that further prosecution of the defendant was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.1 2 7
The Second Circuit held that the prosecution of the defendant for fraud-related conduct, used by the sentencing court to determine the defendant's offense level in a prior conviction, violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 128 Using the Koonce three-issue analysis, the Second Circuit decided that further prosecution of the defendant for conduct already used in sentencing would subject him to the possibility of multiple punishments for the same conduct. 12 9 The court found that the possibility of concurrent sentences did not eliminate the possibility of increased sentences under recidivist statutes or the additional societal stigma that comes from the conviction.' 33 Agent Norman was to fly the contraband into the United States, and Witte was to provide the ground transportation for the drugs once they were brought into the country. 13 4 In July 1990, the Mexican marijuana source advised the conspiracy participants that cocaine might be added to the first shipment if there was room on the plane or if marijuana was not available.' 35 One month later, Witte told Norman that he was prepared to deliver 4,400 pounds of marijuana.' 3 6 Once Norman learned the coordinates of the Mexican airstrip where the drugs were to be delivered from Guatemala, arrangements were made to apprehend the participants. 37 On August 12, 1990, the local authorities arrested Mason and four others, and seized 591 kilograms of cocaine.' 3 8 Norman, remaining undercover, met Witte the next day and explained that the pilots had been unable to land in Mexico because police had raided the airstrip.
139
Norman next contacted Witte in January 1991 and asked if Witte was interested in purchasing 1,000 pounds of marijuana.' 40 Witte agreed to make the purchase and promised to give a $50,000 down payment. 14 1 Witte also indicated he would transport the marijuana in his horse trailer and a motor home owned by an acquaintance, Sam Kelly.' 42 On February 7, 1991, Witte and Kelly met Norman in Houston. 43 Norman agreed to give Witte 1,000 pounds of marijuana in exchange for half of the money up front and agreed to allow Witte three days to obtain the balance.'4 Undercover officers took the motor home and trailer to load the marijuana, at which time Witte took A federal grand jury indicted Witte for (1) conspiring and attempting to possess more than 100 kilograms of marijuana with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § § 841 (a)1 47 and 846148 and (2) aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) 149 and 18 U.S.C. § 2150. The charges, limited to the conduct occurring between January and February 1991, covered only the "reverse-buy" of marijuana-the later marijuana transaction.' 51 On February 21, 1992, Witte pleaded guilty to the attempted possession count and agreed to cooperate with the Government by providing "truthful and complete information" concerning the charged offense as well as any other offenses about which he might be questioned, and by testifying if requested to do So.
1 5 2 As a result of Witte's cooperation, the Government agreed to dismiss the conspiracy count of the indictment and to file a motion for downward departure 5 3 under the United States Sentencing Guidelines if Witte's cooperation amounted to substantial assistance.' In calculating Witte's base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines, the presentence report prepared by the United States Probation Office considered the total quantity of drugs involved in all of the transactions contemplated by the conspirators, including the planned 1990 shipments of both marijuana and cocaine.' 5 5 The presentence report suggested that Witte was accountable for (1) the 1,000 pounds of marijuana in the attempted possession offense to which he plead guilty, (2) the fifteen tons of marijuana that Witte, Mason, and Pokorny had planned to import from Mexico in 1990, (3) the 500 kilograms of cocaine that the conspirators originally proposed to import from Guatemala, and (4) the 591 kilograms of cocaine seized at the Mexican airstrip in August 1990. 156 At Witte's sentencing, both the petitioner and the Government urged the court to hold that the 1990 activities concerning importa- tion of cocaine and marijuana were not part of the same course of conduct as the 1991 marijuana offense to which Witte plead guilty, and, therefore, should not be considered in sentencing Witte for the 1991 offense. 157 The district court, however, found that the marijuana and cocaine offenses were "relevant conduct" under § 1Bi.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines and should be taken into account because they were part of the same continuing conspiracy.
158
The court, therefore, adopted the presentence report's aggregation of drug quantities involved in the 1990 and 1991 episodes, resulting in a base offense level of 40, which has a Guideline range of 292 to 365 months' imprisonment. 15 9 Witte received a two-level increase for his aggravating role in the offense and an offsetting two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility. 160 Based on Witte's substantial assistance, the court granted the Government's § 5K1.1 motion for downward departure. 161 The court sentenced Witte to 144 months in prison in light of that departure. 162 The sentence was 148 months below the minimum sentence of 292 months under the pre-departure Guideline range. 163 Witte appealed, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the case because Witte failed to file a brief. 164 In September 1992, another federal grand jury indicted Witte and Pokorny on two counts: conspiring and attempting to import cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § § 952 (a) and 963, respectively. 165 The indictment alleged that, between August 1989 and August 1990, Witte tried to import approximately 1,091 kilograms of cocaine from Central America. 166 Witte moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that he had already been punished for the cocaine offenses because the cocaine involved in the 1990 transactions had been included as "relevant conduct" in his 1991 marijuana offense sentencing.' 67 The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the indictment. 168 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court, holding that "the use of relevant conduct to increase the punishment of a charged offense does not punish the offender for the relevant conduct" and thus does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 170 In reaching this result, the Fifth Circuit expressly disagreed with contrary holdings in the Second and Tenth Circuits.' 7 '
Seeking to resolve the conflict among the circuits, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari' 72 to determine whether a court violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment by convicting and sentencing a defendant for a crime when the conduct underlying the offense has been considered in determining his sentence for a previous conviction. 173 IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the Court,' 74 Justice O'Connor affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit, holding that where the legislature has authorized such a particular punishment range for a given crime, the resulting sentence within that range constitutes punishment only for the offense of conviction for purposes of the double jeopardy inquiry.' 75 Accordingly, the Court found that the prosecution for the cocaine offenses was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause as a second attempt to punish Witte for the same crime.
176
Justice O'Connor began her analysis by addressing the function of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which is to prevent both successive prosecution and successive punishment. 17 7 Specifically, the Double 
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concluded that it made no difference whether the enhancement occurred in the first or the second sentencing proceeding. 189 In both Williams' case and Witte's case, the sentencing courts used uncharged criminal conduct to increase the petitioners' sentences within the ranges of the violated statutes. 190 Justice O'Connor likened the enhanced punishment to recidivist statutes, noting that the Court has rejected Double Jeopardy challenges in the case of recidivist statutes. 191 Under recidivist statutes, the enhanced punishment imposed for a later offense is not an additional penalty for previous crimes, but rather, it is "a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive one." 192 Justice O'Connor also rejected Witte's argument that the Sentencing Guidelines warrant a special Double Jeopardy analysis.' 9 3 According to Justice O'Connor, the defendant is not punished more under the Sentencing Guidelines' "relevant conduct" than he would have been under a pre-Guidelines sentencing court that could choose to take into account the uncharged conduct'1 9 4 Rather, Justice O'Connor explained that the "relevant conduct" provisions are "designed to channel the sentencing discretion of the district courts and to make mandatory the consideration of factors that previously would have been optional." 95 Thus, the defendant is punished only for the convicted offense, regardless of whether a certain act is taken into account by statute or as an act of discretion.
196
Justice O'Connor then went on to address Justice Stevens' contention 9 7 that under the Sentencing Guidelines "an offense that is included as 'relevant conduct' does not relate to the character of the 189 Id. In other cases involving a defendant's background and conduct not arising out of the same criminal offense of which the defendant was convicted, enhancement statutes "do not change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction." Id. (quoting Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. i921, 1927 Ct. i921, (1994 197 Id. at 2211 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
offender (which is instead reflected by criminal history), but rather measures only the character of the offense." 1 98 Justice O'Connor responded that the difference between "criminal history" and "relevant conduct" in the Sentencing Guidelines is "more temporal than qualitative." 19 9 She maintained that under the Sentencing Guidelines, "criminal history" 20 0 referred to a defendant's past criminal conduct, 20 ' while "relevant conduct" 20 2 referred only to those activities that arose out of the same criminal conduct as the instant offense. 203 The Sentencing Guidelines aggravate punishment, not for a different offense, but for a related crime to the extent that the present offense was carried out in a way warranting increased punishment. 2 0 4 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor concluded that while relevant conduct "may relate to the severity of the particular crime, the commission of multiple offenses in the same course of conduct also necessarily provides important evidence that the character of the offender requires special punishment." 20 5 Justice O'Connor also noted that because nothing controls how the sentencing judges use the extraneous information, under Justice Stevens' framework, the Sentencing Guidelines' structure would not affect the outcome of the case. Finally, in addressing Witte's fear of potential unfairness the Court pointed to procedural safeguards built into the Sentencing Guidelines. 2 0 7 The Sentencing Guidelines specifically address the possibility of separate prosecutions involving the same or overlapping "relevant conduct." 208 The Sentencing Guidelines attempt to coordinate sentences in this situation, so that the punishment imposed approximates the total penalty that would have resulted had the sentences for the different offenses been imposed at the same time. Thus, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the offenses run concurrently. 2 10 Moreover, the sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the given range if it finds aggravating or mitigating circum- 
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN
PART
Justice Stevens dissented from the judgment, 2 18 concluding that the DoubleJeopardy Clause should preclude any subsequent proceeding for the cocaine offense. 2 19 Justice Stevens argued that the majority's decision weakened the fundamental protections provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 22 0 Witte was put in jeopardy of punishment for the cocaine transactions when he was punished for those offenses at the marijuana sentencing.
crimes. 223 Rather, the judge evaluates the nature of the defendant's responsibility for past acts and the likelihood of future misconduct.
24
Thus, recidivist statutes are consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause only because the defendant's prior conduct is evidence of the defendant's character. 225 Justice Stevens suggested that offenses considered at sentencing that are somehow linked to the offense require a different analysis. 226 Offenses that are linked to the previous conviction may affect both the character of the offense and the character of the defendant. 2 27 The Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated if a sentence relies on an offense as evidence of the defendant's character. 2 28 However, where the sentence relies on the offense as an aggravation of the underlying offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated because the defendant is punished for committing the offense, not for what the offense discloses about his character.
9
Justice Stevens argued that the Sentencing Guidelines distinguish between "relevant conduct" and the defendant's criminal history. 230 According to Justice Stevens, "relevant conduct" clearly refers to the character of the offense, 23 ' while criminal history refers to the character of the defendant. Using the example of multiple drug crimes, Justice Stevens illustrated the Double Jeopardy violation that occurs by the mandatory consideration of "relevant conduct." 23 3 The severity of a drug offense is based on the total quantity of drugs from all offenses constituting "relevant conduct," regardless of whether the offenses were charged or proved at sentencing. 2 34 Thus, the defendant is sentenced for an offense that may be the subject of a second indictment. 2 35 The transactions fix his punishment just as if he were convicted of it.23 6 The imposition of punishment demonstrates that the defendant was "just as much in jeopardy for the offense as if he had been previously [Vol. 86
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Based on this conclusion, Justice Stevens argued that none of the cases relied upon by the majority compel the Court's holding.
2 38 In Williams v. New York, 239 the evidence of the defendant's previous criminal conduct was important because it revealed the defendant's character.
2 40 Justice Stevens noted that the opinion did not suggest that if the sentencing court used evidence to determine a sentence for an offense more serious than the convicted offense, the defendant would not have been placed in jeopardy for that more serious offense. Justice Stevens also rejected the majority's reliance on Williams v. Oklahoma because the Williams Court applied a weak version of due process rather than the Double Jeopardy Clause. 242 Justice Stevens distinguished Williams from Witte because Williams focused on the use of a prior conviction in a subsequent sentencing proceeding. 243 He emphasized that the Williams Court did not address whether the second prosecution was barred because the defendant had already been punished for the instant offense. 244 Justice Stevens concluded that due to the lack of precedent supporting the majority's decision, the Court should have looked to the text and purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 2 45 Witte received a punishment that included the cocaine offense. 246 Because he was in jeopardy of a second punishment for the cocaine offense, standing trial for the offense should have been barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
47
Finally, Justice Stevens summarized the protections available for Witte through the Sentencing Guidelines. 2 48 He noted that departure power is available to protect against unwarranted double punishment and to prevent the possibility of depriving Witte of the effect of downward departure. 249 Thus, Justice Stevens joined the majority's statutory holding in part III of its opinion, which interpreted the Sentencing Guidelines as containing procedural safeguards, because it mitigated the possibility of an unfair result. 250 V. ANALYSIS This Note argues that the majority correctly held that, where the Sentencing Guidelines have authorized a punishment range for a particular crime, the resulting sentence within that range constitutes punishment only for the convicted offense for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 25 1 In part A, this Note asserts that the Sentencing Guidelines require the same Double Jeopardy analysis as that traditionally used for sentencing. In part B, this Note contends that although the Court did not explicitly address congressional intent regarding multiple convictions and "relevant conduct," its ruling is consistent with congressional intent. In part C, this Note explains why Justice Stevens' distinction between the character of the defendant and the character of the offense is flawed. When a court sentences an imprisoned defendant for a second offense committed before his imprisonment began, § 5G1.3(b) may apply. Section 5G1.3(b) is relevant where the defendant has an undischarged prison term resulting from offenses considered in the first conviction's sentence. 2 8 7 The sentencing court takes into account the offenses underlying the first conviction to determine the second conviction's offense level only if it is relevant conduct with respect to the second conviction. 2 8 8 Section 5G1.3(b) applies when the sentencing court considers the offenses underlying the second conviction as "relevant conduct" in determining the first conviction's sentence because "relevant conduct" is reciprocal. 28 9 Section 5G1.3(b) addresses cases where a defendant is prosecuted "for different criminal transactions that were part of the same course of conduct." 290 Thus, the Sentencing Commission did not contemplate that consecutive prosecutions would be prohibited by considering "relevant conduct" in determining the first sentence. 291 Moreover, neither the Sentencing Reform Act nor the Sentencing Guidelines prevent prosecutions involving the same course of conduct.
2 92 In conclusion, because the Sentencing Guidelines contemplate sentencing multiple offenses separately, the majority properly determined that there was no Double Jeopardy violation in Witte. Although in Witte the Court did not explicitly discuss congressional intent, it complied with congressional intent when it discussed the Sentencing Guidelines' procedural safeguards. The majority argued that "the Guidelines take into account the potential unfairness" in § 5G1.3. 293 According to the majority, the Sentencing Guidelines leave some discretion with the sentencing court in order to protect the offender's rights. 2 .3(b) , which states that if the previous undischarged prison term resulted from conduct taken into account in the determination of the instant conviction's offense level, the instant conviction's sentence will run concurrently to the previous undischarged prison term.
2 97 Section 5G1.3 permits a defendant to be prosecuted and sentenced in more than one federal proceeding for different criminal offenses that were part of the same course of conduct.
29 8 Section 5G1.3 reflects Congress' intent to prevent punishment from being more severe if the government chooses to prosecute the defendant at two different proceedings, instead of only one proceeding. 29 9 Congress accomplished this goal not by barring a second prosecution, but rather by mandating that the resulting prison term's length not be longer than that which would have resulted from conviction on both counts at a single proceeding. 3 0 0 Though the Second Circuit had the benefit of § 5G1.3, it incorrectly distinguished § 5G1.3 from the situation in McCormick. 30 ' In considering whether § 5G1.3 applied to the facts of the case, the McCormick court found that the protections of § 5G1.3(b) apply where punishment for a current offense is determined by taking into account conduct for which the defendant has previously been convicted and sentenced; conversely, the court found that § 5G1.3(b) does not apply to the situation that the Second Circuit faced, where sentencing for a defendant's past conviction was based on conduct that is currently the subject of a second prosecution. 30 2 The McCormick court incorrectly assessed § 5G1.3(b) because it ignored the application of "relevant conduct" to sentencing for the first offense, and overlooked the possibility that the defendant could have been punished in the second proceeding for his "relevant conduct." 30 3 In sum, the Witte majority followed congressional intent by finding that Witte could be sentenced for an offense considered "relevant conduct" in his previous sentencing. First, the majority employed the Blockburger "same elements" test, which reflects legislative intent to impose separate sanctions for multiple offenses arising in the course of a single act or transaction. Second, the majority considered § 5G1.3 and other procedural safeguards found in the Sentencing Guidelines which demonstrate congressional intent to punish crimes such as Witte's separately. Finally, the majority abrogated two appellate decisions that misinterpreted congressional intent.
C. THE INADEQUACIES OF JUSTICE STEVENS' DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CHARACTER OF THE DEFENDANT AND THE CHARACTER OF THE
OFFENSE
Justice Stevens' distinction between the character of the defendant and the character of the offense is unworkable. According to Justice Stevens, the cases that do not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause are those that only consider conduct as evidence of the defendant's character, including criminal history unrelated to the instant offense. 30 4 On the other hand, Justice Stevens contended, the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated where the sentencing court considers the character of other offenses, which occurs when the conduct is linked to the offense considered at sentencing. 30 5 Justice Stevens believed that the Sentencing Guidelines separate the character of the defendant and the character of the offense into "criminal history" and "relevant conduct," respectively. 30 6 If taken into account as "relevant conduct" in determining the sentence for an offense, Justice Stevens argued that such conduct should not be tried and sentenced separately because the sentencing court incorporated punishment for that conduct in the first sentence. Justice Stevens pointed to the Sentencing Guidelines "criminal history" section 3°8 to assert that a defendant is punished twice for an offense when that offense was considered "relevant conduct" in a pre-
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY/SENTENCING GUJDELNES vious sentencing. 30 9 The "criminal history" section only accounts for criminal actions by the defendant if he was under any criminal justice sentence before or during his conviction. 310 Therefore, if left with only "criminal history" as a reflection of the character of the defendant when sentencing him, those offenses that were committed in the same course of conduct as the offense for which the defendant was convicted would never be considered. 311 Justice Stevens' exclusion of "relevant conduct" conflicts with the judges' traditional consideration of these surrounding circumstances when sentencing a defendant.
Federal courts should consider a defendant's conduct surrounding an offense because it reflects the character of that defendant. Traditionally, sentencing courts have considered circumstances surrounding an offense, other than the elements of the offense, where the defendant who commits a crime reflects a need for increased punishment. 3 1 2 Moreover, recidivist statutes have been declared constitutional because a defendant's repetition of crime demonstrates that his character requires more severe punishment. Without giving any guidance as to how the character of the defendant and the character of the offense should be used by the lower courts in sentencing, Justice Stevens insisted that they should be assessed differently. 3 14 Justice Stevens admitted that it is almost impossible to determine whether a sentencing court used an offense to assess the character of the defendant or the character of the offense. Consequently, differentiating between the character of the offense and the character of the defendant serves no practical purpose.
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority correctly decided that there was no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause in Witte. The role of the Double Jeopardy
